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John B. Carroll 
New Perspectives in the 
Analysis of Abilities 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
INTRODUCTION 
One can understandably be skeptical when a "new perspective" is offered on a 
topic that has been under scientific examination for a very long time. I am not 
sure that I have any truly new perspectives , but I entertain the notion that my 
perspectives have the kind of novelty that will last long enough to permit taking a 
fresh look at some very old problems and getting new insights into their solution . 
I'm concerned with several such problems: First, what is an " ability"? How can 
an ability be defined? This is a problem that I believe has never been adequately 
addressed in the psychometric literature. Second, how can data from ability 
measurements be best analyzed to help in the definition of the ability , and thus to 
determine what has often been called the "construct validity" of the measure-
ments? Third, what are the implications for the construction of better measure-
ments of abi lity? Throughout my presentation, one detects influences from cog-
nitive psychology-influences that I point out, but my primary concern is with 
psychometric aspects of ability measurements. 
Here, I use the term "ability" in a very general sense, so that it covers both 
the concept of aptitude and the concept of achievement. At the stage of defining 
an ability , the difference between aptitude- thought of as a capacity for some 
future achievement- and achievement- thought of as the demonstration of 
some acquired performance- is irrelevant , because , as will shortly be seen, we 
are concerned in either case with deriving the definition of an abi lity from 
observations of performance. The question of the source of the performance 
(i.e., to what extent it comes through constitutionalJgenetic factors and to what 
extent it comes through learned experiences) need not enter discussion. 
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WHAT IS AN ABILITY? 
The American Heritage Dictionary defines ability as "the quality of being able 
to do something; physical, mental, financial, or legal power to perform." We 
can immediately drop consideration of financial and legal powers; from the 
standpoint of psychological and educational measurement we can be concerned, 
however , with physical and mental powers. Nevertheless , even the definition 
offered by the dictionary has an air of circularity: Ability is defined in terms of 
"being able to perform something," and ironically enough, the word able is 
defined in terms of "having sufficient ability." I'm afraid the dictionary is of 
little help in defining " ability," except possibly in the phrase "ability to per-
form something." What is this something? In the context of psychological and 
educational measurement, must it not refer to some class of tasks? If we think of 
commonly recognized abi lities such as athletic ability, or musical abi lity , the 
common assumption is that a person with such an ability is able to perform well a 
variety of tasks that can be called athletic, or musical , as the case may be. When 
psychologists and educators speak of "mental ability," they are referring to 
performance in a variety of "mental" tasks . The question is, what is a "mental" 
task? 
We know that abilities are often of a more specialized character. A good 
basketball player is not necessarily a good IOO-yard runner; a good pianist is not 
necessarily a good composer, or not even a composer at all. Evidence from 
factor-analytic investigations of mental abilities suggests that there exist a 
number of somewhat unrelated mental abilities: verbal ability, reasoning abi lity , 
spatial abi lity , numerical ability, and so on. Correlational and factor-analytic 
evidence is of some use in classifying and identifying abi lities, because it yields 
information on what abilities are likely to go together or to be separate. More 
precisely , it yields information on the classification of the tasks that call for 
different abilities. 
Let us focus on the fact that the tasks that call for a particular abi lity, whatever 
it is , can be of considerable variety , perhaps even of infinite variety . How do 
they vary? One dimension along which they vary is their difficulty. One can often 
diagnose what causes tasks to vary in difficulty. In simple cases, it may be a 
matter of physics or physiology. In basketball, it is harder to shoot a basket from 
a long distance than from a short distance. In musical performance , Bach In-
ventions are generally much easier to play than most of the compositions of, say, 
Debussy . In fact , it has long been the practice of music educators to assign 
grades of difficulty to instrumental musical compositions; I do not know whether 
anyone has analyzed exactly what makes for ease or difficulty of such composi-
tions. 
In psychological and educational measurement , the concept of difficulty turns 
up in the form of information about the proportions of tested samples or popula-
tions that are able to "pass" each of the items on a test. Such information is 
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often used in arranging the items of a test in order of difficulty, apparently on the 
assumption that subjects will be more comfortable in taking the test if they can 
start with easy tasks. But as in the case of musical compositions, there is usually 
little concern with what makes items easy or difficult. Test makers often simply 
take item difficulty data as givens that need not be questioned further. Note, by 
the way, that " items" on a psychological or educational test are really " tasks" 
that call for correct performance; the more of these tasks the examinee can 
perform correctly, the higher the score, and the higher the level of "ability" that 
is inferred from the score . 
A preliminary evaluation of the "construct validity " of a test is often made 
simply by considering the class of tasks that is involved in the test . If all the items 
are concerned with English spelling, for example, the test may be regarded as a 
test of "spelling ability ." Or if all the items seem to involve " manipulation of 
visually presented spatial relationships," the test is regarded as a test of "spatial 
ability." But intuitive classifications of tasks are often unsatisfactory, perhaps by 
their very nature . They yield no guarantee that there is only one spelling ability , 
or only one spatial ability. In the case of spatial abi li ty , at least , the available 
evidence is to the contrary (Lohman, 1979) . 
At the same time, it is often pointed out that it is di fficult to establish the 
unitary or nonunitary nature of abi lities from correlational studies of items or 
tasks. The difficulties are technical, stemming from problems with the interpreta-
tion of bivariate distributions of item responses. Much of our knowledge about 
the differentiation of abi lities comes from factor-analytic studies using scores on 
multi-item tests, the tests being composed of series of plausibly similar items. 
There is now some promise in recently developed techniques for item factor-
analysis (Wi lson, Wood, & Gibbons, 1984) but as yet these techniques have not 
been widely applied , and I myself have not yet had the opportunity to use them. 
But I am getting off the track. Suppose, for the sake of argument , that we 
have a set of tasks that can be demonstrated to measure a single abi lity at 
di fferent difficulty levels. What might convince us that they measure a single 
abi lity would be evidence that there are systematic relationships between charac-
teristics of individuals and the levels of difficulties of the tasks, such that indi-
viduals who can perform the more di fficult tasks have a uniformly higher proba-
bility of passing the eas ier tasks than those who can not perform the more 
difficult tasks, and also, such that individuals who cannot perform the easy tasks 
also cannot perform the harder tasks. This idea is not new; to my knowledge it 
was firs t pointed out by David Walker, a Scottish educational psychologist , in a 
series of papers published in the British Journal of Psychology over the years 
193 1 to 1940 (Walker, 193 1, 1936, 1940). Walker called tests hav ing the above-
mentioned property " unig," whereas tests not having this property were called 
" hig" (from the express ion " higgledy-piggledy" ). Walker anticipated the idea 
of what later came to be known as the Guttman scale, and I li ke to refer to it as 
the Walker scale, or perhaps the Walker-Guttman scale. 
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There is much more to this idea, however , I can best illustrate it by referring 
to data that I collected some years ago on a test that I believe can be shown to 
measure a single dimension of ability , namely musical pitch discrimination abil-
ity. This is the old Seashore Sense of Pitch test; in fact, the data I collected were 
for the 1919 version of the test. Let me describe this test, in case you are not 
familiar with it. It consists of 100 items , divided into ten subsets of 10 items 
each. Each item in a given subset presents, by a phonograph recording , two tones 
that differ in pitch by a certain amount , constant over the items in the subset; the 
subject's task is to indicate on the answer sheet whether the second tone is higher 
or lower than the first. The pitch difference in the easiest subset is 30 cycles per 
second, or (considering the overall pitch level) about a semitone; the pitch 
differences in other subsets range down to one-half cycle. Subjects are required 
to make a response to each item, and thus there is obviously an element of 
guessing, or success by chance, of 50%. I may note, incidentally, that some 
years ago Guilford (1941) (while he was in the psychology department at the 
University of Nebraska) collected and analyzed data with this test and claimed 
that the test measures three separate abi lities. I have recently shown, however 
(Carroll, 1983) that Guilford was misled by statistical artifacts, and that the test 
measures essentially only one ability. Imperfections in the 1919 recording add a 
certain element of response set bias, but this may be ignored for practical 
purposes. 
In a further analys is of the data I co llected on about L 100 college students, I 
wanted to study curves of performance in relation to the pitch differences of the 
subtests. How did the curves of performance for students with high scores 
compare with those for students with average and low scores on the test? I 
divided the total score distribution into deciles and plotted average performance 
curves for each decile. The results are shown in Fig. 8. L. The baseline is scaled 
in terms of the logarithm of the pitch difference; the ordinate shows the proba-
bility of correct performance. As may be seen, the data are quite systematic. 
High ability students have practically perfect performance for subtests with large 
pitch differences; their average performance descends to a threshold only at a 
pitch difference of about 1.25 Hertz, the limen or threshold being set at 75 % 
correct (halfway between perfect and chance performance) . Students in the 
lowest decile of ability, on the other hand , have on the average a threshold 
performance at a pitch difference of about 20 Hertz. 
The curves have , as one might expect, the general shape of normal ogives, 
and have approximately the same slope. This slope can be expressed in terms of 
the logarithm of the pitch difference: one standard deviation of the response 
curve is about .25 log pitch difference units. I believe that this slope is in fact 
characteristic of pitch discrimination ability. Even with a better-recorded test , 
and with many more items , this slope would probably not change much . The fact 
that the slope is not higher, as it would be if the slopes were as represented in 
Fig. 8.2, puts a certain constraint on the reliability of any test of pitch discrimina-
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FIG. 8.1. Person characteri stic functions for deciles of the total score distribu-
tion, Seashore Sense of Pitch test (N = 1082). 
tion ability . At least , it 'puts a constraint on the reliability-per-item, and thus on 
the reliability of a test of any given length . (It is possible, in fact , to specify the 
limits on reliabili ty in terms of parameters of the slope function.) 
Of even more importance is the fact that these data support the existence and 
definition of pitch discrimination ability, in the sense that pitch discrimination 
ability is revealed in a systematic relation between individual characteristics and 
performance on subtests of di fferent pitch difference levels. What makes for 
" difficulty " in pitch discrimination is the smallness of the pitch difference . High 
ability individuals have much smaller pitch difference thresholds than low ability 
individuals. 
These data illustrate a paradigm that I believe can be transferred or applied to 
any ability. That is, an abili ty- any ability- can be defined in terms of the 
relation between individual thresholds of performance and the characteristics of 
tasks of different degrees of " difficulty. " In the case of pitch discrimination 
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ability, it is clear that the task characteristics are described in terms of pitch 
differences, and individual differences can be referred to threshold points on the 
pitch difference scale. What about other abilities? 
To introduce this topic further, 1 present one other set of data, this time on a 
Block Counting test that was administered by my colleagues at the University of 
North Carolina (Johnson & Meade, personal communication) to lOth-grade-
children in a study of the development of spatial abilities. The Block Counting 
test has been regarded as a test of some kind of spatial ability. The test used in 
this study is a little different from other block-counting tests that appear in some 
test batteries. Sample items are shown in Fig. 8.3. Each item is a perspective 
drawing of a pile of blocks; the subject's task is simply to count the blocks and 
write down the answer. Subjects are told that all blocks in a given drawing are of 
the same shape. Because the answers are free responses, there is practically no 
guessing element. 
In Fig . 8.4 are shown average probabilities of correct answers for sets of items 
of varying difficulties, for ninths (noniles) of the total score distribution for 119 
10th graders . Again, the data are quite systematic. High scoring individuals get 
correct answers on most of the "easy" items, and have only a little trouble with 
the hard items. Low scoring individuals have trouble even with the easy items , 
and have very little chance of passing the hard items. One can specify thresholds 
of performance for different individuals. Beyond stating it in terms of difficulty 
level, however, the baseline scale cannot easily be described. We must study , 
therefore, what makes the items easy or hard, since whatever makes for task 
difficulty is what gives rise to differences in ability, and thus leads toward a 
definition of that ability. 
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FIG. 8.3. Sample items from a Block Count ing test, arranged to suggest the 
effec t of "symmetry" and of the proportion of non vi sible blocks on item difficulty 
(p = proportion of 10th grade students giving correct answer). Copyright 1986 by 
Industrial Psychology Inc., 515 Mad ison Ave nue , New York, NY 10022. All 
rights reserved. Permiss ion gra nted for limited reproduction in profess ional psy-
chometric journa l in thi s instance onl y. 
Detailed examination of the items, arranged in order of difficulty (proportion 
fai ling), discloses that they vary mainly in two characteristics : (I) the proportion 
of blocks that are not " visible" because they are hidden by other blocks, and (2) 
what I call the "symmetry" of the piles, that is, a characteristic such that one can 
use arithmetic computations to arrive more quickly at the number of blocks. The 
first of these variables has the greatest influence on item difficulty , but it in-
teracts with the second . In Fig. 8.3 I have arranged the 4 sample items in such a 
way as to suggest how these task characteristics affect item difficulty. The two 
items in the bottom row have no or few nonvisible blocks, and are relatively 
easy, whi le those in the top row have many nonvisible blocks and are harder. The 
items in the left column have little "symmetry" ; the subject must simply count 
the blocks more or less one by one. The items in the right column have high 
symmetry, and counting the blocks can involve some simple arithmetic. For 
example, the item at the lower right appears to be composed of a wall of 3 x 3 = 
9 blocks at the left, plus an adjoining wall of 2 x 3 = 6 blocks, or 15 blocks in 
all. The items in the left-hand column are somewhat eas ier than those in the 
right-hand column . 
From this analysis, it appears that the ability chiefly measured by this test is 
the ability to visualize the positions of blocks that are not immediately vis ible . 
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Secondarily, it measures an ability to use simple arithmetical processes in arriv-
ing at answers. As a matter of fact, the "symmetry" dimension in this task may 
tend to distort the assessment of the subject's ability to visualize missing blocks. 
Possibly a better, purer test of visualization ability could be devised by construct-
ing all items with a minimal amount of symmetry, so as to reduce the possibility 
of using arithmetical processes. 
Suggested by these findings , further questions could arise and be answered by 
appropriate investigations. Is the ability to visualize hidden blocks specific to the 
block counting task , or would it be found to be correlated with abilities in other 
types of visualization tasks , for example, the "surface development" test used by 
Thurstone (1938) or the mental paper folding test studied by Shepard and Feng 
(1972)? The answers to such a question cou ld be found by analyzing data for the 
surface development and mental paper folding tests in the manner I have describ-
ed, and examining relationships among the task parameters of the several tests. 
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THE PERSON CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTION (PCF) 
The curves shown in Figs. 8.1 and 8 A-curves relating average performance of 
individuals to item difficulty-may be called person characteristic functions 
(peFs). They have approximately the shape of normal ogives with a negative 
slope, descending from perfect or near perfect performance for "easy" items, 
through a threshold point, to zero or chance performance for "difficult" items. 
These curves are the reverse of the item characteristic curves familiar in item 
response theory. As a matter of fact, one can model these curves using precisely 
the same mathematical formula that is used in item response theory as developed 
by Lord (1980) and others. This is the three-parameter logistic function ex-
pressed as follows: 
I - c 
p = c + -:--,-------,,-----,.-=-----;-;;-----;-= I + exp [-1.7a(6 - b)]' 
where p = the probability that an individual with ability 6 will correctly perform 
an item or task characterized by the parameters a, b, and c, where 
a = a parameter for the slope of the function; 
b = a parameter specifying the difficulty of the item or task; and 
c = a parameter specifying the probability that an individual completely lack-
ing in ability ( 6 = - 00 ) will nevertheless perform the item or task 
correctly, as (often) by guessing. 
The difference is that the person characteristic function plots performance for an 
individual (or group of individuals) as a function of item difficulty (the b param-
eter), whereas the item characteristic function plots performance for an item as a 
function of individual ability (the theta parameter 6). Both functions assume that 
all items measure the same latent ability (or cluster of abilities) . Item charac-
teristic functions have well-known uses in test theory, as Lord (1980) has shown. 
Use of the person characteristic function was first explored by Mosier (1941), 
although he did not call it that. The advantage I see for it is that it emphasizes the 
relation between ability and item or task difficulty. When there is a definite 
relation between ability and item difficulty, one is encouraged to explain that 
relation in terms of the characteristics of items or tasks. 
Item response curves can also be used to look at these relations, but in this 
case one has to compare the functions for different items. This may be illustrated 
with data that I developed for vocabulary (opposites) items in the SAT, as shown 
in Fig . 8.5. (The data available to me did not permit computing person charac-
teristic functions.) What we see in Fig . 8.5 are item characteristic curves for 15 
vocabulary items; performance (in terms of percentage correct) is plotted against 
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FIG. 8.5. [tern characteri stic curves for 15 verbal oppos ites items from a fo rm of 
the SAT-V (from Carro ll , 1980). 
5 ability levels, actually quintiles (fifths) of an item analysis sample of 1920 
cases with a mean SAT score of 416 and a standard deviation of 110. Obviously , 
as ability increases, correctness of performance increases; the curves are gener-
ally of a normal ogive shape with a positive slope. Note, however , that for most 
of the more difficult items, the percentages correct for low-scoring groups are 
well below chance levels (chance being 20% since these are 5-alternative items). 
The curves tend to have a U-shaped concavity, poss ibly because it is the low-
average group , at an average SAT -V score of 358, that is most likely to be 
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seduced into choosing an incorrect alternative. The very low scorers don't even 
have enough ability to be seduced in this way; they are the ones who are most 
likely to answer by guessing . 
The difficulty of the items can be measured in e ither of two ways: by the 
" delta" value derived from overall percentage correct, or by the threshold value 
estimated from the item characteristic curve. These two measurements are highly 
correlated, though not perfectly. What are the task characteristics of the items 
that make for difficulty? I estimated the familiarity of the words in the " lead" 
and the correct choices by using "SFI" (standard frequency index) values from 
the American Heritage Word Frequency Book (Carroll, Davies, & Richman , 
1971) . From these indices, item difficulty as measured by ETS's "delta" could 
be predicted with a multiple R of .80 (p < .01) . This finding supports, at least, 
the rather obvious conclusion that these items are measures of vocabulary knowl-
edge. What is more, however, the analysis using word frequency statistics makes 
it possible to specify in rather exact quantitative terms the range of vocabulary 
knowledge exhibited by examinees of given levels of ability. For example, 
consider the vocabulary knowledge shown for the top fifth of the sample, with a 
mean SAT-V or 570. These people have no trouble with words like CONCEAL, 
STALE, STIFF, DOUBTFUL, EQUILIBRIUM, and VENTURESOME, and 
the keyed correct answers expose, fresh, limber, unquestionable, lack of bal-
ance, and timid, respectively . But I find it rather disturbing that they tend to have 
trouble with words like PARTISAN, DISCREPANCY , ELICIT, SOMBER, 
WHET, ENIGMATIC, PAUCITY, AMIABLE, and INFERNAL. 
One other example from my analysis of SAT items is instructive. (These data 
are more fully discussed in Carroll , 1980.) Figure 8.6 shows item characteristic 
curves for 10 "verbal analogies" items of an SAT-Verbal test. The common 
supposition is that these items measure ' ' reasoning ," that is, ability to discern an 
analogy. Sternberg (1977) developed a rather elaborate model for the behavior of 
solving analogies, involving among other processes the "encoding" of the stim-
uli, the " inference" of relations, and the "mapping" and the "application" of 
those relations. The question may be rai sed: To what extent do these processes 
make for difficulty of these items? 
There is little evidence here that the examinees have difficulty with the con-
cept and structure of an analogy per se. Even very low-scoring individuals have a 
fairly good chance of passing a simple analogy like number 27. This suggests 
that the SAT verbal analogies test does not measure the ability to solve analogies, 
as such, in the sense that low-scoring individuals would be less able than high-
scoring individuals to deal with analogical structures, apart from their content. 
Instead , the evidence suggests that the harder items involve more difficult encod-
ings, and more difficult and subtle inferences, mappings, and applications than 
the easy items. To a certain extent, there are vocabulary difficulties; Thus, low-
scoring individuals probably have difficulty in encoding concepts represented by 
words like "slink," " furtive," and "innocuous." But the major difficulty 
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FIG. 8.6. Item characteristic curves for 10 verbal analogies items from a form of 
the SAT-V (from Carroll, 1980). 
arises from the complexity of the rules that are the bases of the analogies. 
Consider, for example, the hardest of these items: 
34. BARREN:PRODUCTIVITY:: (A) torrid :warmth 
(B) innocuous:harm (C) aberrant change 
(D) prodigal:reform (E) random:originality 
The words in the lead, BARREN and PRODUCTIVITY, are not particularly 
difficult words. The rule relating them is fairly complex: BARREN is an adjec-
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tive, and PRODUCTIVITY is an abstract noun that signifies a property opposite 
to that of BARREN. The examinee has to find a choice that correctly exemplifies 
this relation. From the item analysis data we find that alternative C, aberrant: 
change, is rather tempting, as is also alternative D, prodigal: reform, and with-
out careful thought they might appear to exemplify the rule. Only alternative B, 
innocuous: harm correctly exemplifies the rule, but it does so in a fairly subtle 
way. Unfortunately it would be difficult, though perhaps not impossible, to 
establish a metric for the difficulty of rules used in verbal analogies items . I 
would think, however, that it might be possible to make the construction of 
verbal analogies tests more of a science and less of an art by devoting deliberate 
attention to constructing items according to a metric for rule-difficulty. 
COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND TASK DIFFICULTY 
Much of the current research in cognitive psychology is devoted essentially to 
finding what elements or aspects of cognitive tasks make them easy or difficult, 
and in this way the work is directly relevant to test construction and interpreta-
tion. One can find many examples, and I can mention only a few. 
There has been considerable investigation concerning attributes of tasks used 
in tests of spatial abilities . Pellegrino and Kail (1982), for example, consider 
tasks used in tests of two fairly distinct spatial aptitudes- Spatial Relations and 
Spatial Visualization. In the case of Spatial Relations, the task attributes that 
chiefly make for difficulty (either in speed or accuracy of response) are angular 
disparity and familiarity of stimuli. Pellegrino and Kail (1982) conclude on the 
basis of developmental studies that "individual differences in spatial aptitude are 
initially associated with basic encoding and comparison processes, that such 
differences persist over development, and that the differences are then accom-
panied by additional differences in the speed of mental rotating or transforming 
the information that has been encoded" (p. 333). In the case of Spatial Visualiza-
tion, some of the task attributes that make for difficulty are rotation, displace-
ment of elements, and number of stimulus elements. Considering these facts, 
these authors conclude that "skill in a visualization task such as the form board is 
related to the speed and quality of the stimulus representation that is achieved" 
(p. 354). 
Another example is the work of Goldman and Pellegrino (1984) on inductive 
reasoning tasks. They find, among other things, that "the visual or semantic 
complexity of a particular item affects the degree to which general system char-
acteristics such as working memory and executive monitoring strategies become 
important cognitive components of performance" (p. 193) . 
Similarly, I would interpret the work of Rips (1984) on deductive reasoning as 
an attempt to identify what elements in certain reasoning tasks- verification of 
arguments containing the connectives and, or, (f . .. then, and no/- cause dif-
ficulties for subjects. Rips found stable differences between subjects in their 
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handling of rules of reasoning. Although Rips does not present data allowing this 
direct interpretation, I would speculate that his data suggest that deductive ability 
can be defined in terms of knowledge of and ability to use an increasingly more 
complicated set of deductive rules. 
APPLICATION OF THE THEORY TO COGN ITIVE 
ABILITY FACTORS 
Over the past several years , I have devoted my attention to surveying and in 
many cases reanalyzing data from the factor-analytic literature in an attempt to 
determine what the major dimensions of cognitive ability are. I am aware of 
many of the limitations of factor analysis- they have been pointed out many 
times. Nevertheless, I have been pursuing my survey on the conviction that if 
adequate correlational data are uniformly subjected to presently acceptable meth-
ods of factor analysis, the results will be more meaningful, consistent, and 
interpretable than they have appeared to be in the past. I am now approaching the 
final stages of my survey, and while I am not ready to offer definite conclusions, 
I now perceive a "light at the end of the tunnel" that appears to confirm my 
convictions. 
One conclusion that now seems evident, however, is somewhat contrary to 
my initial expectations. My original expectation was that I could identify, from 
the literature, a fairly large number of factors of ability- not as many as Guilford 
(1967 ; Guilford & Hoepfner, 1971) had postulated and claimed to demonstrate-
but at least a few more than French (1951) and Ekstrom (1979) had listed in their 
reviews of the factor-analytic literature. My present view is that there are not 
more than about thirty distinct, identifiable factors of cognitive ability, and of 
these, many are of a fairly specific nature and of little importance. The factors 
that appear over and over in my reanalyses are mostly those originally identified 
by Thurstone (1938) and other early investigators . Among the first-order "pri-
mary" factors that I believe can be confidently i.dentified are Thurstone's Induc-
tion, Deductive Reasoning, Verbal Comprehension, Spatial Relations, Visu-
alization, Closure, Perceptual Speed, Associative Memory, Word Fluency, and 
Memory Span. In addition, there is fairly solid evidence for a series of "second 
order" broad factors, as identified by Cattell, Horn , and others (e .g., Hakstian & 
Cattell, 1978): factors of " fluid intelligence," "crystallized intelligence ," 
"general visual perception," "general auditory perception," "general speed," 
"general memory capacity," and "general idea production." Even some of 
these factors tend to be correlated, a fact that suggests that Spearman (1927) was 
correct in asserting the existence and importance of a "general" factor, "g". 
My analytic procedures assume a hierarchical model such that some factors are 
of greater generality and applicability than others. The hierarchical model usu-
ally results in specifying two or more independent sources of significant variance 
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for a given variable, that is, variance from a primary factor and also vari ance 
from_ a second- or higher-order factor. 
Earlier, I suggested that the person characteri stic model as illustrated with 
data from the pitch discrimination test and the block counting test could be 
transferred or applied to any ability . My factorial results, however, pose certain 
problems for th is suggestion. 
First , not all factors appear to be characterizable in terms of tasks of varying 
difficulties . Many , for example , refer mainly to the speed of performance of 
simple cognitive tasks, like, for example, the comparison of stimuli , as in the 
Perceptual Speed factor. It is not immediately clear how the person characteristic 
function model can be applied to such factors, unless certain modifications are 
made in the model. One way of doing this is to utilize individual variation in 
speed of response over trials as a basis for developing the person characteristic 
function. A person of a given degree of ability would have an average speed , but 
the probability of exceeding a given rate would decrease as the baseline value 
increases . The general idea is illustrated in Fig. 8.7 . 
The other problem posed by factorial results is the fact that most variables 
show multiple sources of variance- at least two, as 1 have mentioned . On the 
average , I find that about half the common variance of a variable comes from a 
primary or first-order fac tor, and the remainder from higher-order factors. This 
means that many tasks can be supposed to have at least two sources of diffi-
culty- one fro m a primary fac tor and one from a higher-order factor, such as a 
general factor. It would be interesting to work out the implications of this fact for 
the person characteristic function. 1 suspect that it means that peF curves will be 
somewhat attenuated, i.e . , with fl atter slopes , when tasks have multiple sources 
of diffi culty. Nevertheless , it may still be poss ible to separate these effects. 
For example, suppose we are concerned , as we should be, with the source of 
difficulty due to a general factor. That is, independent of the effects of a particu-
lar primary factor, what makes a task di fficult if it also has a high loading on a 
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general factor? If we could find this out, it would contribute to the interpretation 
of the nature of the general factor. One possibility is deliberately to select tasks 
that have loadings on different independent primary factors, and then study the 
person characteristic function for such tasks and the task attributes that function 
to make them load on a general factor. I am not aware that such an idea has ever 
been tried. I intend at least to work out the theoretical model by which this might 
be accomplished, or to determine whether or not it might be accomplished at all. 
DISCUSSION 
The major points I have been trying to emphasize are the following: 
I. The existence of an ability can be demonstrated when it can be shown that 
for any individual, there is a systematic, monotonic, and close relation between 
the individual's probability of correct or satisfactory performance and the diffi-
culties of a series of tasks, and when there are variations over individuals in the 
parameters of this relation . 
2. The ability is defined in terms of the attribute or attributes of the tasks that 
give rise to differences in task difficulty. 
3. This formulation, or one closely similar to it, is applicable to any cognitive 
ability. 
4. Cognitive psychology can be of help in the definition of cognitive abilities 
by investigating what attributes of tasks make for differences in the accuracy or 
speed with which individuals can perform those tasks, because such attributes are 
involved in the definition of abilities. Further, knowledge of task attributes can 
lead to inferences about the psychological processes that are called for in perfor-
mances, and thus about the psychological processes that underlie a given ability. 
A corollary of this formulation is that effects of education, training, or other 
forms of intervention can be indexed by changes in the position parameter of an 
individual's person characteristic function. A significantly positive effect of 
learning or an educational intervention, for example , would be exhibited in a 
significant increase in the individual's threshold of performance along the task 
difficulty scale. 
The person characteristic function (PCF) model can be shown to apply at least 
in a number of "simple cases ." Probably it could be shown to apply to most of 
the major types of ability that have been identified. Undoubtedly certain com-
plications would arise in more complex cases. Among these complications are: 
I. The possibility that task performance may be a function of more than one 
ability . 
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2. The possibility that tasks could be performed through different "strat-
egies" or approaches. 
3. The possibility that at least some abilities, especially those representing 
educational achievements, involve results of specific learning . The fact that 
individuals may vary in what particular learnings they may have achieved, inde-
pendent of the overall difficulty of those learnings , may present problems in 
applying the PCF model to certain kinds of abilities. 
No doubt it would be fruitful to study the problems posed by these complica-
tions, but I believe that such studies would be appropriate only after considerable 
success has been achieved in applying the PCF model to "simple cases." Since 
this has been done thus far to only a limited extent, there is a wide field of 
problems open for examination. 
One final remark: I have only intimated how all this might help in better test 
construction. I will try to be more explicit: We can make better tests of abilities 
by paying more attention to the task characteristics that make for item ease or 
difficulty and to the role of such task characteristics in defining the abilities we 
seek to measure. 
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